I’d never heard the incorrect explanation. I’ve always heard “there are no winners in nuclear war” and “the only winning move is not to play.”
But the story I had was of countries A and B going to war, country A uses nukes, country B uses nukes in retaliation. I didn’t consider the case that a loser of conventional war would then use their nukes. I hope we never find out whether nukes will be used at the beginning, middle, or end. I would be interested to hear reasons why the either side would wait.
I think a country being invaded would have good reasons to wait. Launching nukes can potentially scare an invader away, but could also invite nuclear retaliation. It seems to me that conventional resistance and diplomacy would almost always be worth trying first. But if annexation is imminent, the country has little to lose, so is much more likely to do a first strike.
An invading country, on the other hand, would have ~no reasons to do a first strike throughout the invasion, as the costs of a nuclear retaliation remain constant (and very high) for it.
If country A decides to call B’s bluff and launch an invasion:
B can roll over. Not the worst plan, but if A knew this was the policy from the start, then they would be certain to invade.
B can wait on the nukes and suffer conventional invasion.
B can launch a small nuclear attack.
B can launch all out nuclear war. It escalates and both countries are destroyed.
Assume B launches a small nuclear attack. In response Country A can:
Withdraw: save civilians and troops at the cost of embarrassment.
Nuke back: Nuclear war escalates with both countries being obliterated.
Continue invasion: Country B nukes Country A again, and A faces the same choice again.
Clearly the best choice for A is withdraw. Knowing this, B’s best move is to skip being invaded and launch the small nuclear attack (assuming B isn’t pushovers). Knowing this, A’s best move is to not invade unless they are sure B are pushovers. The result is that A never invades B. If A does invade B, B will use nukes early.
In your example, there is an asymmetry: B seems to have an option to do a small nuclear attack, but A can either do all-out nuclear war or not use nukes at all. Realistically, if B does a small nuclear attack, A would respond with a small nuclear attack of its own (on an uninhabited piece of infrastructure, military base, etc) without resorting to all-out nuclear war. B knows that with a first strike, it could kickstart a nuclear escalation during which tensions run high and accidental launches become much more likely. Also, nuking is a bright red line in international politics; if B crosses it early while it is being invaded, it's likely to lose foreign diplomatic support, aid, etc. Both to keep international support and avoid entering a nuclear escalation, B seems likely to wait.
Empirically, this dynamic bore out as well in 1999. Pakistan invaded India, but India responded using conventional means instead of doing a nuclear attack early.
I think the human mind reacts to male and female deaths differently. We subconsciously know the reproductive rate is almost entirely determined by the number of women and treat that as too valuable to lose. I'm serious.
I’d never heard the incorrect explanation. I’ve always heard “there are no winners in nuclear war” and “the only winning move is not to play.”
But the story I had was of countries A and B going to war, country A uses nukes, country B uses nukes in retaliation. I didn’t consider the case that a loser of conventional war would then use their nukes. I hope we never find out whether nukes will be used at the beginning, middle, or end. I would be interested to hear reasons why the either side would wait.
I also enjoyed the war history examples.
I think a country being invaded would have good reasons to wait. Launching nukes can potentially scare an invader away, but could also invite nuclear retaliation. It seems to me that conventional resistance and diplomacy would almost always be worth trying first. But if annexation is imminent, the country has little to lose, so is much more likely to do a first strike.
An invading country, on the other hand, would have ~no reasons to do a first strike throughout the invasion, as the costs of a nuclear retaliation remain constant (and very high) for it.
Country A and Country B both have nukes.
If country A decides to call B’s bluff and launch an invasion:
B can roll over. Not the worst plan, but if A knew this was the policy from the start, then they would be certain to invade.
B can wait on the nukes and suffer conventional invasion.
B can launch a small nuclear attack.
B can launch all out nuclear war. It escalates and both countries are destroyed.
Assume B launches a small nuclear attack. In response Country A can:
Withdraw: save civilians and troops at the cost of embarrassment.
Nuke back: Nuclear war escalates with both countries being obliterated.
Continue invasion: Country B nukes Country A again, and A faces the same choice again.
Clearly the best choice for A is withdraw. Knowing this, B’s best move is to skip being invaded and launch the small nuclear attack (assuming B isn’t pushovers). Knowing this, A’s best move is to not invade unless they are sure B are pushovers. The result is that A never invades B. If A does invade B, B will use nukes early.
In your example, there is an asymmetry: B seems to have an option to do a small nuclear attack, but A can either do all-out nuclear war or not use nukes at all. Realistically, if B does a small nuclear attack, A would respond with a small nuclear attack of its own (on an uninhabited piece of infrastructure, military base, etc) without resorting to all-out nuclear war. B knows that with a first strike, it could kickstart a nuclear escalation during which tensions run high and accidental launches become much more likely. Also, nuking is a bright red line in international politics; if B crosses it early while it is being invaded, it's likely to lose foreign diplomatic support, aid, etc. Both to keep international support and avoid entering a nuclear escalation, B seems likely to wait.
Empirically, this dynamic bore out as well in 1999. Pakistan invaded India, but India responded using conventional means instead of doing a nuclear attack early.
I think the human mind reacts to male and female deaths differently. We subconsciously know the reproductive rate is almost entirely determined by the number of women and treat that as too valuable to lose. I'm serious.